Abstract: In recent decades, the concept of religion, and specifically its application to non-Western historic cultural formations has come unter critical scrutiny. This paper proposes the study of semantic fields as a method to explore the self-understanding of historic formations of what, in modern parlance, counts as religion, and thus, as a testing strategy for the concept of religion that is employed in scholarly analysis. It uses the said method to analyse three works by the medieval Japanese Buddhist monk Dōgen (1200Dōgen ( -1253, who came to be revered as founder of the still extant Sōtō school of Zen Buddhism. By putting his notion of the 'Buddha Way' (butsudō) into strong relief, it provides a basis for comparison with modern concepts of religion. The conclusion is that Dōgen's ideas conform to a surprisingly large extent with modern ideas. This may be one reason for his popularity in modern times. But Dōgen should not be taken to represent the general world-view of medieval Japan. Further comparative analyses of other corpora remain necessary to gauge the applicability of 'religion' as a category for the analysis of medieval Japanese culture.
to subsume under the category of religion, we will do well to remember these points.
First of all, we need to be aware that to address some source, or behavior, or institution as 'religious' is, at least in all instances where this does not conform with the self-identification of the object of analysis, first and foremost a statement about our received notions of it. The implications of said subsumption have to be made explicit, and they should be tested against the available evidence. Both demands are difficult to meet, albeit for different reasons: the first one requires a self-conscious questioning of one's agenda that will, of necessity, be limited by one's evaluation of what is trivial and self-evident, and what is possibly problematic. The second demand poses the more pedestrian, but similarly tricky problem of how to design testing strategies that lead us out of the circle of our preconceptions.
In this paper, I propose the study of semantic fields as one such testing strategy, and thus, a viable avenue to advance a nuanced analysis of the 'religious'. In doing so, I do not mean to champion this approach as an exclusive one; quite to the contrary, I believe that it is in need of complementation, e. g. via the study of legal norms, or of pertinent social practices. Even so, I sustain that studying the semantic field of the 'religious' can provide critical insights into the cognitive organization operative in a given corpus. And this may eventually also be of help in shaping alternative avenues for research into the matter in question.
There are two basic components to the kind of study I want to propose: the first is discourse analysis, i. e. the analysis of the modes of communication and the semantical sequences operative in the corpus in question. 6 The second component is the analysis of the semantic relations among key terms used to identify and characterize what we subsume under the 'religious.' In other words, here we ask how those words that are used to identify and characterize what we understand to be a case of 'religion' are connected both logically and in terms of their respective meaning. 7 The first component may not usually be considered to be part of the analysis of semantic fields. However, such analysis is crucial if we are interested in reconstructing the meaning of 'religious' utterances for those who used them, because the significance of an utterance is largely determined by the modes of communication and the types of semantical sequence it employs.
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While this kind of analysis may be conducted on any text that appears, to us, as a token of religion, some types of documents can be considered to be of special significance for our problem, i. e. the relationship between the category of religion and the cultural realities (including cognitive orientations) of the sources to which the category is applied. Generally speaking, I am refering to documents in which some cultural unit, which we believe to embody religion, is established as a matter of concern, either in order to delimit it over against other units, or in order to elucidate its substance and characteristics, or both. This may happen from the inside of a given unit, or from its outside-in fact, in documents concerned with delimitation of a unit x vis à vis other units yz, the internal and the external modes co-exist with some necessity. The following table gives examples of pertinent document types: 9 A systematic study of available documents of these kinds in a given cultural situation should provide us with a realistic understanding of how the field of what we term 'religion' was framed by relevant actors at a specific time and place -was 'religion' considered as a field of its own, with a claim to a specific kind of authority and validity, over and against e. g. political authority or legal validity? If yes, under what name and associated with which kinds of prerogatives? If no, which categories subsumed what we understand to be religion? Table 1 : Document types identifying the "religious".
Document type
Semantic function delimitation -administrative, legal or historiographical texts concerned with the relation between different kinds of authority -of norms and spheres of authority (religious vs. secular or other)
-inter-denominational discussions, comparisons
-from other teachings / traditions internal differentiation -texts establishing a new school / teaching -of sub-denominations (schools, groups, etc.) -texts regulating the relationship between denominations -classifications of expertise (curricula, layouts of institutional organisation etc.)
-of essential subjects, themes, issues within the tradition
What kind of sub-categories existed, and what was conceived of as differentiae specificae?
The results of such analysis may then be compared to indicators of implicit understandings.
The corpus: Dōgen's instructions for seekers on the Buddha way
In the following, I shall provide one part of such an analysis for a historical situation that has received much attention by scholars of Japanese religion, namely that of the early medieval period (the so-called Kamakura period, 1192 -1333 . I will analyze pertinent writings of the Buddhist monk Dōgen (1200-1253), who, some generations after his demise, came to be revered as the founder of the Japanese Sōtō School of Zen Buddhism. 10 He thus belongs to the group of founding figures who, in the classical modern view of Japanese religious history, brought about the popularization and indigenization of Buddhism in Japan. 11 I will discuss the potential shortcomings of that choice in a later paragraph. For now, it may suffice to say that he was a figure of some, though not eminent, relevance in his day. His attempt to establish himself as the leading proponent of the Buddha's teaching met with failure. But he produced voluminous writings concerned with identifying and elucidating a comprehensive agenda for realizing the "Buddha Way" (Butsudō 仏道) -an agenda that has, so far, been more or less unambiguously described in modern literature as 'religious.' Additional characterizations, such as the identification of Dōgen as one of Japan's most important philosophers, are, to my knowledge, never combined with the proposition that he was not a religious thinker. 12 The aim of the following analysis is to evaluate how this 10 On the formation of Dōgen as a canonical figure, see Bodiford 2006 . 11 This historiographical theory was famously criticized by Kuroda Toshio in the 1970s. See Kuroda 1996 and the re-evaluation of his intervention by Sueki Fumihiko (Sueki 1996) . 12 Watsuji Tetsurō, who has arguably been most seminal in pushing for a philosophical reading of Dōgen, says in his introduction: "I would be content if what I am writing would cause people to take interest in this outstanding religious person (shūkyōka 宗教家) and if it became clear that the essence of our culture cannot be correctly understand without reflecting on religionists of his kind." (Watsuji 1992 (Watsuji [1926 : 237). Steven Heine states in the preface to his Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen: "Finally, the work attempts to gorund comparative philosophy and religion in a specific yet universal issue, underscoring the differences between Heidegger's theoretical approach to ontological disclosure and Dōgen's insistens that philosophy can and must spring from direct religious experience." (Heine 1985: ix) 'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way general assessment relates to the way he described his own agenda and positioned it in the cultural world around him. Heine (1997) for a discussion of the relative position and importance of his writings, and Steineck (2014) for a discussion of the various constellations of authorship in the works belonging to that "canon". 15 DZZ I: 729-746; ET Waddell and Abe 1971. 16 DZZ II: 253-260; ET in Tanahashi 1985: 31-44. 17 DZZ I: 405-414; ET in Nishijima 1994 -1999 ET in Nishijima 1994 -1999 The chronological order is of some importance, because the texts represent all stages of Dōgen's writing career. There has been extensive discussion about whether or not his teaching underwent significant changes in terms of its essential content: on the one side of the spectrum of opinions, some scholars have argued that he started out with a fairly universalistic and philosophical bent, but lapsed into increasing sectarianism in later stages of his career (as represented by the fascicles "Buddhist Sūtras" and Shizen bikku).
19 On the opposite side, some see a turn from antinomian, elitist mystical philosophy to a more orthodox brand of Buddhism precisely in his later years. 20 I would concur with Steven Heine's assessment of the problems associated with either position -namely that both of them are based on selective chronologies and corpora, and ignore the discursive setting of the writings in question, which addressed different audiences in highly divergent situations. 21 Furthermore, as will become clear in the following paragraphs, Dōgen is consistent in his polemic against a certain brand of mystical monism that is conducive to ethical antinomianism and doctrinal syncretism, and he upholds a position that he styles as orthodox Buddhist teaching. On a different note, the titles of the first two writings, Bendōwa and Gakudō yōjin shū, make apparent the fact that, to both Dōgen and his adressees, it was self-evident that "the way" (dō 道) in question was the Buddha Way (butsudō 仏道), which, for fear of anachronism, I will for now refrain from equating with "Buddhism" (bukkyō 仏教). There was in both cases no need to distinguish this Buddha Way from other "ways" (whatever "way" meant), since Dōgen was addressing an audience already committed to it; but there was some dispute as to what precisely the Buddha Way consisted of, and what would be essential to those who aspired to it. 22 In these and other writings, extensive delimitation from other teachings occurs only in terms of a rectification of perceived delusions about the Buddha Way -including the idea that it was ultimately one with the other teachings -and it is in this context where the latter is explicitly identified. Furthermore, other teachings are never discussed, in Dōgen's works, for their own merits or for the sake of discussion or dialogue between various different denominations.
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2 Negotiating the way
In the following, I shall discuss the texts in chronological order, starting with a discourse analysis and proceeding to an elucidation of the semantic fields of key terms.
As mentioned above, the first text, Bendōwa 辨道話 ("Discourse on negotiating the way"; in the following: Discourse) was composed by Dōgen in autumn 1231 in the vernacular. 24 We do not know exactly who was the recipient of the manuscript, but it probably circulated among his disciples and relatives / acquaintances at court at the time. Although the title indicates orality, there is no evidence that it was based on actual verbal communication. This is in contradistinction to a large part of the vernacular Shōbōgenzō collection, which was based on informal "Dharma talks" given to various audiences at Dōgen's temples of residence.
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22 One feels tempted to write "to those who walked it," but that, again, would be an anachronism: the Buddha Way in Dōgen's language is "attained," "grasped," or, horribile dictu, "missed," but one does not walk it. See Steineck 2018. This may in part be due to the fact that the character dō 道, if used in a verbal sense, meant "to say, to speak", making the primary meaning of butsudō "Buddha's sayings" (cf. Bukkyōgo daijiten, entry "Butsudō"). 23 Lest this should invite an evolutionary view-from narrow parochialism to enlightened generosity-let me hasten to remind the reader that four centuries earlier, the Shingon patriarch Kūkai integrated all known teachings of the time into his system. 24 I have discussed this text in more detail in previous publications (Steineck 2009b and 2015) , and reiterate some points from these publications here in an abbreviated form. 25 Heine 1997. In terms of its overall sequence of propositions, Discourse starts with a passage describing a mysterious practice shared by all enlightened beings. It identifies this practice with seated meditation (zazen 坐禪) and extols it as the superior gate to the state of self-induced immersion in highest insight (jijuyō zammai 自受用三昧).
26 Why this should be so, is in need of explanation, and the explanation follows after the author has established his own record and legitimatized his position as a teacher of the "right law/dharma of the Buddha house (Bukke no shōbō 佛家の正法)." 27 Remarkably (at least from a modern, doctrine-oriented point of view), the first step in the explication proper consists of a narrative of transmission. 28 Only after that is the reader informed about the metaphysical workings of the practice identified with highest insight: Seated meditation is supposed to lead to immediate contact with all Buddhas and patriarchs and to transform the realm of practice into one of enlightenment. 29 The following questions and answers delimit the teaching in a field of competing interpretations of the Buddha Way. They also address questions of the feasibility of its teaching for disciples remaining in the secular world, thus displaying concern for individual salvation. 30 There is no general discussion of alternatives outside the Buddha Way, and no general survey of the field of possible "ways" or "teachings." Since the adressees have been made out to be true disciples of the Buddha, such discussion would arguably have been out of place. However, the question and answer part contains an extensive refutation of the proposition of an eternal essence of enlightenment, identified with the faculties of perception and discrimination. This view, advanced by some Zen Buddhists, is identified by Dōgen as not belonging to the Buddha Way. 31 Furthermore, the final section contains an argument concerning the legitimacy of the endeavour to explicate a new interpretation of the Buddha Way without being authorized to do so by a royal request. 32 It thus points to a contemporary norm placing discussions on the Buddha Way under the control of royal authority, and at the same time attempts to establish a (possibly new) normative understanding that would accept legitimizing motives beside authorization by royal command. 'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way
As to the mode of communication, the Discourse gives a first exposition of Dōgen's teaching, couched in terms of the "true essence" (shinketsu 眞訣) of the "right law/dharma of the Buddha house" (Bukke no shōbō 佛家の正法). Its purported aim is to inform (shirashimen to su しらしめんとす) those earnestly seeking the Buddha Way of this essence. 33 The text is therefore primarily referential, although it carries a strong conative overtone: it informs about something that is "right" (shō/tadashi 正) and thus carries strong normative expectations towards conduct. In fact, one might say that the ulterior motive is conative, although the form of the message is largely referential. Occasional emotive expressions concern either the sad fact of aberrant positions or the sad fate of earnest seekers on the way who go astray because of the absence of true teachers.
The choice of semantic sequences confirms this observation. The dominant sequence type is that of explication, with several descriptive and narrative sequences supporting the argument.
It should be noted that, by choosing to present his message as an explication (instead of an argument, or narrative), the author locates himself in a position of authority that is in some contrast to his actual social status: still young and with no clerical rank to speak of, and only the authorisation of a Chinese master on record in a denomination that was not yet acknowledged by royal authority in Japan, Dōgen had, in the eyes of his contemporaries, at this point in time only questionable authority of judgment over other Buddhist lineages and doctrines; what is more, he had gained some degree of notoriety for having alienated parts of the clergy. 34 For all his assumption of a position of superior insight, the precariousness of his status is exposed in the final passage of the Discourse, one of the few instances where Dōgen resorts to argumentation in order to establish the legitimacy of the document itself. 35 This would not have been necessary had Dōgen been authorized by either the clergy or royal command to expatiate on his views -a position that he apparently sought, but never achieved, and therefore a decade later disparaged in the fascicle "Buddha' To sum up, this is a document presented by an expert of something called the Buddha Way, commanding precarious credentials, to an audience that is expected to share adherence to that way. The expert tries to assume a position of authority, and he gives a new interpretation of said Buddha Way that is contestable; however, he avoids to argue for his interpretation and instead resorts to explication, placing himself in a position of superior knowledge and insight. Conversely, his readership is relegated to the position of disciples in need of instruction. The main content of the 'teaching' is twofold: firstly, a history of transmission, and secondly, a practice of meditation that is supposed to bring about immediate contact, indeed unity, between the practitioner and beings of a superior quality. In accordance with the discourse setting of 'teaching', the communication mode is predominantly referential, although the ulterior goal is to change the recipients' behavior. A further agenda consists in securing a separate field of normativity for the Buddha Way beside that of legal authority, which resides uncontestedly (at least as the Discourse is concerned) with the royal court.
In putting forward its interpretation of the "Buddha Way," the Discourse makes operative use of a web of logical and semantical relations that further determine the meaning of the term beyond explicit propositional explication or definition. The following table presents the various ways by which the object of the teaching is identified in the initial exposition (sections Ia, Ib, Ib' in Table 3 ). Table 4 : Identification/characterisation of the object of teaching.
Locus
Quote / translation Identifying/qualifying terms § , DZZ I: . 諸佛如來、ともに妙法を單傳して、 阿耨菩提を證するに、最上無爲の妙 術あり。The Buddha-Tathāgatas transmit the mysterious law/dharma together, and in attesting to anuttara bodhi ("supreme insight") they possess the miraculous technique of highest wuwei/asaṃ skṛ ta ("noninterference/the unconditioned").
-superior entities with honorific names (Buddha, Tathāgata) -predicates indicating the extraordinary  (wondrous/ miraculous) -superlatives -technical terms indicating connection to a primary & secondary locus (India, China) (continued ) 37 I prefer the term 'extraordinary' to 'supernatural', because 'supernatural' presupposes a concept of 'nature' that excludes certain kinds of actions and events, such as 'miracles' and the like, from the realm of the natural. Such a concept of nature did not exist in medieval Japan. The five houses may differ, but they are only the one Buddha heart seal.
-internal differentiation: A single tradition, differentiating in two streams, ending up in five gates, identified as shū (schools). Emphasis on unity. Other Buddhist schools are only implicitly mentioned as having transmitted writings only.
'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way
As is apparent in the table, the teaching of the Discourse identifies its field of concern via the names and honorific titles of beings with extraordinary or even superlative qualities. These are said to transmit something of both epistemic and practical normative significance. Strong emphasis is placed on a distinct line of transmission. Technical terms point to a soteriology of insight leading to freedom/unconditioned existence.
The precise meaning of these defining aspects is put more sharply into relief by an analysis of the semantical oppositions in which they stand in the text itself. Some examples are given in the following table:
According to the Discourse, the Buddha Way thus stands in a fundamental and antonymical opposition to all non-Buddhist views, which are characterized as "outlying" and "obstructive". Within the Buddha Way, there is an opposition between the right transmission, defined by true practice (i. e. zazen), and the transmission of the canonical writings only, without concomitant practice. Accordingly, the right teachers, who transmit both an understanding of the scriptures and the practice are opposed to those who only study and teach the canon. Among adherents of the Buddha Way, there is furthermore a distinction between those who formally reject ties and obligations to their family (lit. "those leaving their house") and those who continue to abide in the profane world. This opposition, however, is overcome by the virtues of the supreme practice taught by the Discourse. Finally, the Discourse also maintains that the fundamental soteriological opposition between the cycle of birth and Further information about the semantics of the Buddha Way in the Discourse can be gleaned from an analysis of the categorical relations into which the key terms enter in the text. I shall use here a syncretic list of categories collated (or, to be more honest, bastardized) from Aristoteles and Kant. To start with substance, much concerning "what the Buddha Way is" (according to the Discourse) has already been described in some detail above. Highest, liberating insight, true practice (of seated meditation) and a line of authoritative transmission appear to be most essential. In terms of quantity, the Discourse maintains that the Buddha Way is one, although even its orthodox tradition is differentiated into the five "houses".
38 These, by the way, all belong to the Zen School (zenshū 禅宗), which the Discourse insists on identifying with the Buddha Way: it is thus, according to its nomenclature, not a "school" beside others, but the one true tradition of authentic practice and teaching. 39 As for its quality, the Buddha Way is real with additional characterizations such as "mysterious," "unsurpassed" or "right" pointing to its extraordinary and normative aspects. Its fundamental unity notwithstanding, the Buddha Way comprises such things as authoritative writings (kyōsho 経書), methods of practice (mon 門), three canonical fields of study (sangaku 三学), six perfections (rokudo 六度), etc. 40 The Buddha Way is furthermore locally positioned through an origin in India and a path of transmission via China to Japan. 41 Its temporal existence, however, is not bound by restrictions, as the Discourse insists that the substance of the way is identical independent of time. Attainment of the Buddha Way is conditional on "right trust" (shōshin 正信), and leads to "insight" (satori 悟り); 42 right practice will lead to full possession of the Way, but without practice, there is no possession. In the whole process, the Buddha Way is both passive, in its being attained, and active, in its supporting those who commit themselves to right practice. To sum up, the semantic analysis of the Discourse makes the object of its teaching look suspiciously like a religion: There is a soteriological agenda, reference to beings of a higher quality, the idea of an orthodox teaching and line of transmission, a practical and dogmatic normativity that bears strong 'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way analogies to law but is not subsumed under state authority, a separate social realm of dedicated practitioners, replete with its own hierarchies and fields of study and expertise, and repeated reference to insights beyond the regular human level and mysterious capacities. There are terms to conceive of other teachings outside the Buddha Way. But they are highly charged with negative values and thus far from neutral. The common denominator would be -dō 道 ("way"), although this term does not appear, in the Discourse, as a general noun subsuming both the "Buddha Way" and the "Outlying Ways".
In this sense, the similarity of the semantic field between the Buddha Way according to the Discourse and the classical modern notion of religion may still be misleading. To briefly discuss some of the more salient differences, in terms of substance, the Discourse may make ample reference to the mysterious and extraordinary qualities of the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and patriarchs, whom it clearly treats as elevated and sacred beings, but it disqualifies the notion of an ontologically transcendent realm with soteriological qualities. Although it mentions "right trust" (shin, which could also be translated as "belief") as an important condition of salvation, trust is not so much characterized by belief in certain doctrines, but by unwavering dedication to the "true practice" of seated meditation. The "doctrinal" elements are again not so much concerned with the actions and commandments of a higher being, but first and foremost with a lineage of transmission, and secondly, again, with the realization of right practice. If the Buddha Way of the Discourse is a religion, it appears to be more concerned with what people do, than with what they think or believe. However, this again may be a misleading exoticism, since the practice in question is supposed to lead to right -even supreme -insight, and thus to a substantial change in the cognitive state of the practitioner. Furthermore, we need to remember that the Discourse places itself in a tradition that sees "ignorance" (mumyō 無明) as the root of all evil. Then again, in the language of the Discourse, insight is not so much a question of subjective "experience," but a matter of "proof" (shō 證) through action in accordance with the standard established by the Buddhas and Patriarchs. the Discourse. I will therefore focus on additional aspects and important qualifications.
The Gakudō yōjin shū 學道用心集 ("Essentials of Studying the Way," below: Essentials 44 ) is a short document of ten sections written 1234 in the kanbun (logographic notation) style as a basic manual for Dōgen's monastic disciples. Unlike the Discourse, it is not a document that attempts to convince outsiders or potential, but as yet unconfirmed disciples. Instead, it was probably written for the basic instruction of the monastic community that had begun to form around Dōgen at that time. In keeping with the apparent aim to guide and educate, the communicative mode is informative-referential and conative. The dominant type of semantic sequence is again explicative. But in Essentials (as opposed to the Discourse) this is a choice in keeping with the status of the adresser, because Dōgen was the uncontested preceptor of this community. That said, it should be noted that an eighteenth century commentary attests to a remarkable aspect of text usage that stands in some contrast to these observations, as it enjoins members of the monastic community to recite the text on a daily basis. 45 We do not know when this kind of text usage originated, but should it have been intended from the start, the Essentials may have not been for purposes of information to the extent the communicative mode of the text suggests; instead, they would have served as a kind of aide-memoire, and as a token of allegiance to the founder. As regards the previous discussion about the status of the cognitive versus the practical in Dōgen's Buddha Way, the first section of the Essentials significantly deals with the postulate "to bring forth the bodhi-mind" (Bodaishin o hassubeki koto 可發菩提心事). 46 The technical term "bodhi-mind" is elucidated by a reference to an alleged saying of the Indian partriach Nāgārjuna identifying it with "the mind singly contemplating birth and cessation and the impermanence of the profane world" (tada seken no shōmetsu mujō wo kanzuru kokoro 唯觀世間生滅無常心). As Dōgen explains, to focus for a long time on such contemplation will prevent the arousal of the "thought of a permanent self" (goga no kokoro 吾我心) and of craving after "fame and gain" (myōri 名 利); instead, the practictioner of such contemplation will "practice the way like he was trying to save himself from a fire on his head" (gyōdō wa zunen wo sukuu 行道救頭燃). 'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way practice, such practice must be sustained by whole-hearted cognizance of a certain ontological truth. 48 Incidentally, the Essentials sum up proper conduct of disciples of the Buddha Way by two components: listening to the teaching of a "right master," and practicing seated meditation. Here again, we find the combination of a cognitive activity with a practice as defining the core of the right path. As is apparent from the phrases quoted in the above paragraph, the Essentials operate with a contrastive opposition of the common world and the Buddha's teaching that is strongly reminiscent of the distinction between the profane and the sacred. Consider the first explicative sentence of section three "In the Buddha Way, it is absolutely necessary to prove and enter by way of practice" (Butsudō wa kanarazu gyō ni yorite shōnyū subeki koto 佛道必依行可證 入事): "A common (zoku 俗) [teacher] said: Through study one can gain wealth. The Buddha taught: Within practice there is realization (shō 證). It is unheard-of that without studying someone should earn wealth or that without practicing someone should attain realization."
49 While the emphasis in this passage is on the analogies between both realms, the distinction is clearly maintained, and other sections repeatedly reinforce the contrasting of "fame and gain" (the alleged principle of the common world) with the bodhi-mind and the realm of right practice and enlightenment. Section 7 of the Essentials contains an instance, singular in our corpus, where the nominal phrase dō is used as a hyperonym denoting all extant "ways". This, however, is balanced by the immediate assertion of the absolute superiority of the Buddha Dharma/Law: "The Buddha Dharma excels among various ways. For that reason people seek it. When the Tathāgata dwelt in the world, there were no two teachings and no two teachers."
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In sum, analysis of the semantics in the Essentials confirms the impression that Dōgen's concept of the Buddha Way is in many ways congruent with the modern notion of religion, with the important qualifications that strong emphasis is placed on the question of lineage and allegiance to a "right master," and that a specific practice (seated meditation) with a strong corporeal aspect is 48 Is it sophistry to remark here that Immanuel Kant defined "belief" by an assumption of the truth of a particular proposition that is supported by experience and reason and strong enough to become the basis of action? Cf. presented as essential part of the doctrine. Furthermore, while dō and kyō can function as hyperonyms which, in principle, subsume various 'religions', Dōgen regularly denies the equivalence of the hyponyms and insists on the superiority of the Buddha Way he promotes: his taxonomy is clearly a partisan one, and not crafted or suited to the equanimous contemplation and analysis of various ways of life.
Insisting on Buddha's teachings
According to its colophons, the fascicle "Buddha's teachings" is based on an informal lecture Dōgen gave to his monastic community at Kōshō-ji, in the vicinity of Heian-kyō (present day Kyōto), in December 1241 or 1242.
51 It apparently reacts to the influx of a new group of followers hailing from the Nihon Daruma shū 日本達磨宗, in the spring of 1241. The latter denomination was an ill-fated school of Zen that had been outlawed for its allegedly antinomian teachings.
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In this fascicle, Dōgen maintains a mystical and holistic view, according to which the Buddha's teaching is one and ever-present in all parts of reality -a position that was probably shared by his addressees. At the same time, he takes issue with an interpretation of this position that would identify supreme truth with an insight transcending language, transmitted outside the verbal teachings as laid down in the canonical writings (Skt. sūtra, Jap. kyō 経), and communicated independently of them (kyōge betsuden 教外別傳).
53 This position was widely held within the Song period Chan school, 54 and apparently it was also embraced by the followers of the Nihon Daruma shū. The fascicle takes the form of an argumentative sequence. It starts with the thesis that the Buddha's teaching is one and ever-present, which probably constituted the common ground between Dōgen and his new followers. The scriptures are, as Dōgen goes on to qualify, one of its integral parts. This is opposed to the view that "the one mind that is the supreme vehicle" was communicated by way of a separate transmission, outside and apart from verbal teachings. The antithesis is refuted by way of, among others, a reductio ad 51 DZZ I: 306-314, here: p. 314. ET in Nishijima/Cross 1994 -1999 'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way absurdum type of argument: if the true heart of the Buddha was communicated outside the verbal teachings, the teachings would conversely be "transmitted outside of the heart" (shingebetsuden 心外別傳), and then they should not have been delivered at all.
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Dōgen then discusses two cases from Zen lore that seem to corroborate the standpoint of a separate transmission, and argues to the contrary. In this context, he gives a detailed description of three paradigms of internal differentiation of the teaching into "three vehicles" (sanjō 三乗), "twelve divisions of the teaching" (jūni bunkyō 十二分教), and "nine divisions of the teaching" (kyūbunkyō 九分教), respectively 56 . This descriptive sequence takes up the remainder of the fascicle. We need not review the details here. Suffice it to say that the first term ("three vehicles") refers to the standard Buddhist paths towards salvation (by hearing the Buddha teach and following his advice, by reaching enlightenment by oneself, and by dedicating oneself to the path of the Bodhisattva, vowing to save all sentient beings before attaining nirvana for oneself). The second and third term pertain to different ways of listing and sub-dividing Buddhist lore, including not only sūtras and commentaries, but also legendary accounts of previous lives and miraculous deeds of the Buddha. In the context of the fascicle, the descriptive sequence supports the main thesis in two ways: The antithesis mentions only the "three vehicles" and "twelve divisions." By adding a third paradigm of internal differentiation, Dōgen assumes a position of superior knowledge, placing him above his opponents.
Secondly, Dōgen insists that each part of each division is an inclusive realization of the whole of the Buddha's teaching, and that no realization of this teaching negates or excludes another. In other words, Dōgen embraces the holistic viewpoint that the Buddha's teaching is present in every single particle of dust. But he also argues that when it is perceived as such, the resulting insight must comprehend what is said in the scriptures.
In sum, this is an argument about the binding character of a certain set of verbal / written teachings, and the orthodox ways of practice. Both are connected to the Buddha. Together with him, they form the ultimate source of authority. The verbal / written teachings, subdivided alternatively into twelve or nine groups, are therefore posited as integral and essential to the holistic view that supreme insight is somehow present in every part of reality. There is a canon of verbal teachings and practical instructions that is elevated as the 55 DZZ I: 308. Cf. Nishijima / Cross 1994 -1999 ET: Nishijima / Cross 1994 -1999 standard against which to measure claims to enlightened insight. The fascicle thus informs both about the essential elements of the Buddha Way and its internal differentiation in terms of practical paths and groups of verbal / written teachings. "Buddha's Sutras" (Bukkyō 佛經) 57 continues this argument, while adding the topic of external delimitation. Its colophon states that it is based on an informal lecture given to Dōgen's community in the fall of the year Kangen 1 (1243), during a temporary retreat at Kippō-ji in Echizen province. 58 It was thus delivered shortly after the community had left their home temple Kōshō-ji near the capital and relocated to the somewhat remote province of Echizen in Western Japan. This somewhat dramatic move is much debated in the literature, because its reasons are not explained in any of the texts associated with Dōgen. As Steven Heine and Funaoka Makoto have summed up in their respective reviews of the sources and literature on the subject, pressure from the dominant Tendai school on mount Hiei was probably one factor. The success of Enni Ben'en 円爾弁円 (1202-1280), a representative of the competing Rinzai Zen school, also played a part. Enni had secured patronage by a top court official and was appointed head of the Tōfuku-ji, a major monastery under construction close to Dōgen's Kōshō-ji. 59 These external factors, signs of severe competition between monasteries and clerics for aristocratic and state patronage, may have prompted Dōgen to give up on the project to become something like an officially acclaimed "teacher of the realm" (kokushi 国師), an ambition that is clearly visible in early texts like the Discourse. Instead, he now re-oriented his community towards the ideal of reclusive life (tonsei 遁世), 60 and strove to develop a model of temple administration that would ensure a large degree of freedom from political machinations and interference. 61 The choice of Echizen as a location for the reclusive monastery was probably influenced by an offer for temple grounds from Dōgen's patron Hatano Yoshishige. Connections between his Nihon Daruma-shū followers, many of whom hailed from a temple in this region, may also have played their part. 62 This latter motive would explain why Dōgen may have felt an increased need to convince this segment of his community of his own vision of proper understanding and practice, because for them, returning to the vicinity of their home temple would have reinforced old allegiances. In the absence of clear textual evidence, however, all this remains a reasoned conjecture. The fascicle "Buddha's Sutras" reiterates the point that the sutras are an integral part of the teaching, and that seeing them as such is a criterion against which to measure the level of insight. This is contrasted to the teaching of "unreliable stinking skin-bags" (zusan no shūhitai 杜撰の臭皮袋) 63 in the Song empire who exclusively rely on silent meditation and posit the ultimate unity of the teachings of the Buddha with those of Daoism (dōkyō 道教) and Confucianism (jukyō 儒教). 64 The latter view held some popularity in China and was imported to Japan by monks, mostly from the Linji/Rinzai Zen school, who strove to bring the latest new trends from the center of the East Asian cultural sphere to the periphery, their homeland Japan. 65 Remarkably, Dōgen in this passage uses terms that are homonymous to modern Japanese denominational designations, although here they clearly refer to what is being said in the respective literary traditions (and not also for institutions, rituals, and so on). The terms are also used interchangeably with metonymical expressions, which identify traditions by way of their founder figures (Rō Kō no oshie 老孔の教え, "the teachings of Laozi and Confucius"). 66 While Dōgen concedes that there may be some validity in both traditions, he insists that neither Laozi nor Confucius were able to grasp the principle of karmic causality, and the presence of ultimate truth in every instance. 67 The invectives against aberrant views within the Zen school are further connected to derogatory remarks about the patriach Linji that place him among the lower ranks of Zen patriarchs. This polemic may have been related to the attempt to convince the Nihon Daruma-shū followers of the superiority of Dōgen's own interpretation, which integrated the written teachings and orthodox practice into a holistic mystical vision. Or, it may have been an attempt to strengthen ties within Dōgen's community vis-à-vis the upcoming Enni Ben'en. 68 In any case,
where "Buddha's teaching" is spelling out the essential contents and their subdivisions, "Buddha's Sutras" ranks teachers and teachings within and outside of the Buddha Way according to the measure of full and comprehensive insightan insight that is, Dōgen insists, both documented in the canonical literature and transmitted between Buddhas and patriarchs. Since he claims to stand in this line of transmission, he retains for himself a superior vantage point of judgment.
To sum up, "Buddha's Sutras" uses kyō 教 as a general label that can be attached to a qualifying component. The resulting character compounds bukkyō 佛教, dōkyō 道教, and jukyō 儒教, referencing Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian traditions of thought and literature, are homonymous with present-day denominational designations, and synonymous with metonymical expressions such as "the teaching of Laozi/Confucius". Dōgen, however, does not use kyō (or its Japanese reading oshie) as a hypernym. Furthermore, he establishes a clear ranking between the traditions, with insight into the law of karmic causality functioning as one of the differentiae specificae placing the Buddha's teaching in a class of its own. Within the confines of Buddhist teaching and their interpretation, Dōgen insists on a comprehensive and holistic interpretation, and uses derogatory language vis-à-vis exponents of competing views and clerics who base their claim to leadership on political support.
Castigating heresies
The last document to be discussed here is not dated, but was probably written around 1250. By this time, Dōgen had begun to work on a new edition of his collection of vernacular treatises. Shizen biku 四禪比丘 ("The bhikṣu ('monk') in the fourth stage of dhyāna ('immersion')"; quoted in the following as Immersion) 69 belongs to this new collection, of which 12 fascicles were completed. It has been argued that this group of texts was directed at an audience of devotees remaining in the common world, in contrast to the earlier collection, which had adressed primarily the inner circle of monastic disciples.
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68 His invective against monks who assume a position of superiority because of their backing high-ranking patrons supports this conjecture. Cf. DZZ I: 413; Nishijima / Cross 1994 -1999 ET: Nishijima / Cross 1994 -1999 , vol. 4: 195-212. 70 Heine 1997 . Immersion draws on this story to warn disciples not to set their own faculty of judgment above that of the Buddha. In addition, it castigates various views that stem from conflating the wisdom of the unenlightened with that of the Buddha Way. In this context, the text strongly emphasizes the opposition between the common life in the world, and the Buddha way. As a part of this discussion, it reiterates a point already made in "Buddha's Sutras", and repudiates the view of the "unity of the three teachings" (sankyō itchi 三教一致) of Confucius, Laozi and the Buddha.
73 Immersion once more wholeheartedly rejects this vision, and insists on the superiority of the Buddha Way in a manner that introduces a clear distinction between teachings (kyō 教) pertaining to common life and those that transcend its limits. While it does not postulate an ontologically transcendent realm, the text clearly insists on the extraordinary faculties that distinguish enlightened beings from commoners; and it refers to knowledge transcending the boundaries of the present life as precisely one such criterion of distinction. Immersion sums up:
Those who study the way must be very clear about this: Confucius and Laozi did not know the dharma/law of the three temporal worlds, nor did they know the principle of cause and effect, nor did they know anything about how to establish peacefulness in one continent, not to speak of establishing it in all four continents.
74
It is, however, not simply their extraordinary, superhuman powers that set the enlightened beings apart from teachers of the common life. As another passage Nishijima 1999: 207. from Immersion makes clear, the realm of the "common world" includes beings with extraordinary, superhuman powers such as the Indian gods Indra and Brahma; but, Immersion maintains, these are inferior to any human being who has chosen to renunciate and follow the path of monastic life:
And not even Wheel-turning Lords, Lord Brahma, or Indra himself are the equal of a monk who has left home life behind and been ordained, so how could they be equal to the Tathāgata?   75 This, now, does pose a challenge to the notion of 'religion': apparently, in Dōgen's conception the fundamental distinction is between two realms that are extensionally one but intensionally distinct. The realm of "common life" (zoku 俗) comprises human beings, among them elevated wise men such as Confucius and Laozi, as well as gods with miraculous powers, who receive (although Immersion does not elaborate on this) cultic reverences that would fall under most accepted versions of the concept of 'religion.' The realm of the Buddha Way again comprises human beings and the enlightened ones, who have attained higher powers. Both are held to be 'sacred,' although to different degrees. In any case, doubt concerning the teaching of the Buddha Way amounts to 'slander' (bō 謗), and is threatened with massive karmic retribution. The fundamental distinction is thus incommensurate with that between the 'numinous' in a general sense, and the ordinary. It does conform, however, to the idea that religion is concerned with soteriology; indeed, soteriology here defines what counts as 'truly sacred', singling out those aspects of the miraculous and extraordinary that pertain to an (alleged) superior knowledge of the world's condition and its consequences for the achievement of salvation.
Readers in accord with classical modern theory of religion might be tempted to interpret this as conforming to an evolutionary pattern according to which some purely religio-ethical idea supersedes a more primitive attachment to the miraculous. It deserves mentioning, however, that Immersion as well as other writings from the Dōgen Canon, such as the Discourse, are far from de-emphasizing the miraculous powers of the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Patriarchs. Quite to the contrary, Immersion even lists knowledge about "sacred relics" (shari 舎 利; from Skt. śarīra) among the defining differences between the Buddha Dharma and the teachings of Confucius and Laozi, who possess no such 75 Rin'ō, Bon'ō, Taishaku, nao shukke jugu no bikku ni oyobazu, ika ni iwanya Nyorai ni hitoshikaranya. 輪王、梵王、帝釋、なほ出家受具の比丘に及ばず、いかにいはんや如來にひ としからんや。DZZ I: 710. Cf. Nishijima 1999: 203. 'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way knowledge, 76 while the Discourse eulogizes the miraculous effects of seated meditation in no unsure terms. In sum, the teachings of our corpus are no champion of "enlightened religion" in the modern, Western sense -and how could or should they, in the absence of those concepts of science that would force the miraculous out of the natural world?
Conclusions
To briefly sum up, a careful analysis of the semantics of focal terms in our corpus revealed important analogies with prevalent modern notions of religion; among them are the fundamental distinction between a sphere of common life and an elevated sphere of the sacred, which is the source of salvation and conforms to laws of its own, standing outside and above the legal and political authority of common society; the requirement to place trust in the authority of elevated beings, who are believed to possess extraordinary powers of insight and manipulation of reality; the notion of an orthodoxy, denial of which is threatened with dire consequences; the emphasis on a "truth" that calls for belief, even if such belief is supported by evidence from stringent contemplation of common life; and last but not least, general terms that subsume various traditions as so many instances of a kind. Analogies, however, are not equivalences, and the notion of religion may become a 'false friend' if important divergences are ignored: in our corpus, the general terms are never used in a neutral way; they are, in other words, regularly connected to evaluative predications that imply a strict qualitative hierarchy between the referents of the hyponyms; orthodoxy, at least in the Discourse, is defined not by a set of abstract doctrines, but first by lineage and then by ritual practice (although Immersion suggests that some essential doctrines, such as that of karmic retribution, exist); the common world is identified as a sphere of reality that comprises elevated beings with superhuman powers, who are the object of legitimate cultic reverence; the sphere of the sacred is intensionally, but not extensionally posited above the common world; certain miraculous and magical powers and effects are an essential element of the superiority of the sacred realm.
A further question concerns the evaluation of these results. One may argue that the corpus of my analysis was identified and designed in a manner that preconditioned it to find analogies to religion. It is certainly correct to say that, in 76 DZZ I: 712. singling out texts serving to define and elucidate a new teaching, and to educate a community of disciples dedicated to following a teacher, I was led by modern notions of religion (as defined by doctrine, as built by founding figures and centered around leaders, and so forth). Awareness of this circle of reasoning is definitely important in order to prevent one from drawing exaggerated conclusions. What the analysis above demonstrates is simply that there is a text corpus, centered around such a teacher from the Japanese medieval period. This person articulated ideas with certain, essential conformances to modern ideas of religion, and he found a community of followers who shared his vision to some degree. These then built a tradition that has lasted until today. While this may sound trivial, it still proves wrong those who believe the concept of religion to be without true referent in pre-modern times. Yet again, this does not mean that one can now triumphantly apply this concept, without hesitation or much further ado, and expatiate on Japanese religiosity. Quite to the contrary, the analysis above has shown that, even with such pre-selection of texts, there are, on many levels, important divergences to received notions of religion, and these surely demand attention. To re-iterate just one point pertaining not to content, but to performativity: As we have seen above, even a seemingly discursive, explicative text like the Essentials was recommended for use in later times not so much as an object of reflective reading and discussion, but as an object of recitation, a practice that prioritizes appresentation of words over representation of meaning. There is good reason from evidence in the Dōgen Canon to believe that this way of reading was predominant even in Dōgen's community, and that it was connected to belief in the beneficial karmic effects of such appresentation of words. 77 If we focus exclusively on discursive statements of belief, we may well miss what was most essential to those participating in Japanese medieval religion. Furthermore, one cannot equate Dōgen's conceptualization of the Buddha Way with common Japanese notions of his time. In many respects (and his employment of references to the miraculous and magical notwithstanding), he was a representative of 'high religion,' speaking to a limited circle of literate believers from the upper strata of society. Even so, he was evidently often at odds with the views of his audiences/readers. It was modern scholarship that fashioned him as one representative of "Kamakura New Buddhism," and thus, of a distinctly Japanese religiosity. 78 And part of his modern renown may well stem 'Religion' and the Concept of the Buddha Way from the fact that his writings offer enough analogies to modern notions of religion to let him appear, to willing eyes, as a forerunner of contemporary ideals. In terms of historiography, it is thus definitely essential to place Dōgen firmly in the context of the society and culture of his time.
At the same time, the semantical analysis given above has provided us with a nuanced image of the way in which one medieval Japanese intellectual conceived of his own religion and the various teachings of his time. It has proven itself capable of producing information that can correct received notions, and it is thus a road worth taking in exploring concepts of religion -even if it is in need of complementation by other historiographical methods.
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